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Unveiling the Pathos of Life
The Phenomenology of Michel Henry and the Theology 
of John the Evangelist 
John Behr 
St. Vladimir’s Seminary, New York 
From the early centuries, the Evangelist John has been referred to as “the 
theologian.” And rightly so, for Christian theology, as we have come to know 
it, is inconceivable without his Gospel and especially its Prologue. Its words 
have provided the vocabulary for theological reflection thereafter, and it 
seems certain that, until the middle to the end of the second century, the 
annual celebration of Christ’s Passion, Pascha, was only celebrated by those 
who recalled how John had worn the distinctive headdress of the high priest 
in Jerusalem: the only disciple to remain at the foot of the cross, John was, for 
them, the high priest of the paschal mystery.1 It is thus perhaps not surprising 
that it was especially in John, and his words about the revelation of Christ, the 
Word and Life, that Michel Henry found a vision of Christianity that 
resonated with the phenomenology that he had been investigating from his 
initial magnum opus, The Essence of Manifestation, through to his final 
Christian trilogy: first, I Am the Truth: Towards a Philosophy of Christianity, then 
several years later, during which time he read Tertullian and most 
importantly Irenaeus, Incarnation: A Philosophy of Flesh, and finally, appearing 
in print posthumously, Words of Christ.2 
As the title of his first work indicates, what is of interest to Henry is 
“manifestation,” not the various phenomena themselves and their content, 
which are the proper study of the appropriate sciences (chemical phenomena 
for chemistry, historical for history etc.), but that which these sciences never 
take into account, that is, “what makes each of them a phenomenon: the 
appearing in which they show themselves to us—this appearing as such.”3 
Modern phenomenology as practiced rigorously by Husserl, and even as 
carried out by Heidegger, remained, for Henry, too captivated by phenomena, 
as objects that appear in the world to a subject who observes them, to have 
considered the fact of “appearing” itself, that is, that which enables the 
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phenomena to appear. As such, Henry understood his work as a 
radicalization or reversal of phenomenology, rather than a turn towards 
Christianity or the mystical, the supposed “theological turn” in French 
Phenomenology.4 Yet, that this radicalized phenomenology should have led 
him to the study of Christianity is not surprising for, as he notes, the key terms 
of phenomenology—"givenness; showing; phenomenalization; unveiling; 
uncovering; appearance; manifestation; and revelation”—are also central for 
religion and theology.5 As such, Henry does not present us with an account 
of the doctrines of Christian theology or a reading of Scripture such as we 
might expect. Instead Henry opens up the phenomenological structure of 
Christianity, as given to us especially by John, manifesting Truth in the 
generation of Life in the Living One, incarnate in or as flesh, and the call to 
Life given by Christ’s own words. 
Michel Henry’s phenomenological analysis of the Christian revelation 
unveiled in particular by John is radically different, in its idiom and 
movement of thought, from the historical, scriptural, and theological 
disciplines in which John is typically read today. Most readers of John today 
tend to work within the historical horizon projected as the domain for their 
scholarship: John’s text is read either as reflecting or responding to that 
projected historical context (such as persecution, the parting of the ways 
between Christianity and Judaism, or tensions within the Johannine 
community), seeing this as the background for a developing understanding 
of the person of Christ, or else as framing its account of Christ in the narrative 
of the Gospel by deploying the literary forms (such as biographies) and 
frameworks or modes of thinking available in that context (such as Platonism, 
Gnosticism, or more recently and fruitfully apocalyptic), or a combination of 
both. Such accounts, as illuminating as they are, however, are only the first 
step in the hermeneutic of understanding, needing to be melded together, as 
Gadamer put it, with our own horizons. Early Patristic readers of John read 
him with just such a melding of horizons in their own time (yet one that I 
would argue is in continuity, historically and theologically, with John 
himself), reading the Gospel in a paschal and martyric light and elaborating, 
on the basis of the poetics of his text (and those of others, especially Paul), 
what is best described as a theo-anthropological domain of reflection. Henry, 
on the other hand, rejects in principle the historical and exegetical project 
undertaken by modern scholars, and instead, stimulated by the poetics and 
logic of John’s text (and Irenaeus and others), hears the Word addressed to us 
through Scripture as he reflects phenomenologically upon life, how it 
appears, and what it is to live in the pathos of the flesh, a horizon which is 
insistently in the present. Yet as different as Henry’s domain of thought is to 
other ways of reading John, he clearly attains insights similar to those that can 
be found through the historical and exegetical disciplines, especially 
pertaining to what it is to be born into life as a living human being sharing in 
the pathos of Christ. 
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Can, then, these different domains of thought be brought into dialogue 
with each other, even if not directly? Common to these discourses is a concern 
for revelation, or more specifically apocalypsis: indeed, this vocabulary 
(“unveiling,” “manifestation,” “appearance,” “revelation”) is, as Henry notes, 
common to both phenomenology and theology, and also scriptural exegesis 
as practiced by the apostles and evangelists themselves.6 The “apocalypse of 
the mystery” that is “the preaching of Jesus Christ” is “made manifest and 
made known through the prophetic writings” (Rom. 16:25–7), when Christ 
takes away the veil that lies upon Moses so that we, with unveiled face, can 
turn to the Lord to see his glory, and be changed into his likeness from one 
degree of glory to another (cf. 2 Cor. 3.14–18). Similarly in the Synoptic 
presentation of Christ, it is only through the opening of the Scripture that the 
disciples are able to recognize Christ in the breaking of the bread (Luke 24), 
to know, that is, that his Passion—by which he offers us, in the present, to 
share in his living flesh—is not a defeat, as it appears to the world, but a 
victory and the source of life. And likewise for John: although that Jesus is the 
one spoken of by Moses and the prophets is known to the disciples at the 
outset (1:45), it is only once Christ has been glorified that the disciples are able 
to “remember” what had been written of him (12:16), and, by the guidance of 
the other Paraclete, the Spirit, be taught all things and remember all that he 
had said (14:26), and so chew the flesh that he now offers as the exalted Son 
of Man (6:35–66). Continuing in this vein, Irenaeus also speaks of the cross as 
unveiling the treasure, Christ himself, hidden in the Scriptures, which are 
otherwise read only as “myths” or narratives about the past, and which makes 
possible a participation in the eucharist that transforms our own death into a 
eucharistic offering “so that we should never mistake the true understanding 
of things as they are, that is, of God and the human being.”7 
For Henry, on the other hand, it is the rigorous application of 
phenomenology that pierces the veil of the world that lies over our minds, 
enabling us to see through the lies of the world and so come to know truth 
and life, God as Life and ourselves as living ones in his life and sharing in the 
pathos of his flesh. Henry’s phenomenological analysis of the Arch-
intelligibility of the Christian revelation does not proceed by analysing texts, 
for, as he argues, it is only because texts speak of a referent which also shows 
itself to us that texts can even speak of it, whether this is a showing in the 
appearance of the world, where even past historical events can “show” 
themselves to us in the unreal content of our thought, or whether it is Christ 
showing himself to us in the immediacy of our own pathos of life, which is 
ultimately his originary pathos, and calling us into life as enfleshed beings. Yet, 
for Henry, it is nevertheless by reading Scripture that we can be recalled, 
because of our originary identity with Christ as living ones in the Living One, 
from our absorption in the appearances of this world to encounter Christ in 
the pathos of life: Henry’s phenomenology is therefore also a reading of 
Scripture.8 
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As is increasingly acknowledged today, the apostles and evangelists read 
Scripture (the Old Testament) in the light of the Passion to encounter the 
Living One, the Word of God made flesh, and those following them continued 
to read Scripture (now both Old and New Testaments) in the Paschal light 
and a context of martyrdom and eucharistic celebration, being born into life 
and receiving the life-giving flesh of the Word. Similarly, through his 
phenomenological reading of Scripture (now primarily if not exclusively the 
New Testament) Henry finds life in the pathos of the flesh deriving from the 
Arch-Pathos of Christ himself, the First Living One, and his flesh.9 The 
question of how the pathos explored by Henry relates to the pathos that is the 
Passion of Christ is one that will be addressed shortly below. But for now, it 
is important to have established that Henry’s phenomenological reading of 
Scripture rests upon its unveiling just as much as does the apostolic and early 
Christian practice of reading Scripture, as seen by a historically oriented 
reading of their texts. And Henry does this while also addressing head-on the 
need to lift the other veil, that lying over our own minds (cf. 2 Cor. 3:15), as 
also does the early Christian tradition, especially in the ascetic realm, so that 
we can turn to the Lord and see his glory, in the immediacy of the pathos of 
life, before the horizon, or veil, of the world spreads itself across our 
perception.10 By attending, then, through historical discipline, to how 
Scripture was read as Scripture, a space has opened up in which exegetes, 
theologians, and phenomenologists can together read Scripture as Scripture, 
chewing its cud, as Origen puts it, to be nourished by the Word. 
Unveiling necessarily results in a “doubling,” contrasting how things 
appear in this world and the reality that is revealed when the appearances are 
unveiled.11 As this unveiling pivots upon the cross, the originary doubling is 
that of the proclamation of Christ crucified, the gospel: a stumbling block and 
foolishness, on the one hand, but on the other the power and wisdom of God 
(cf. 1 Cor. 1:23–4). And in the wake of this proclamation a series of other 
doublings follow: the text of Scripture, which had been read as narratives of 
the past turn out to be speaking of Christ and his cross; Christ, who had been 
known as the son of Joseph and Mary, turns out to be the eternal Word of 
God; the Eucharist, which appears to be bread, is his living flesh; Jerusalem, 
an earthly city, is our heavenly mother (cf. Gal. 4:26); and also regarding 
ourselves, for though we have “an earthly tent,” we also “have a building 
from God, a house not made by hands, eternal in the heaves” (2 Cor. 5:1), with 
a name “written before the foundation of the world in the book of life of the 
lamb who was slain” (Apoc. 13:8), a contrast, in Henry’s terms, between being 
bodily sons and daughters of human parents yet, as living flesh, sons and 
daughters of God.12 
John Ashton, in examining how the Gospel of John might be described as 
an “apocalyptic gospel,” asserts that “for Enoch, and for apocalyptic writers 
generally, there are not two worlds but one: or rather the whole of reality is 
split into matching pairs (rather like the biological theory of DNA) in which 
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one half, the lower, is the mirror image (albeit in this case a distorting mirror) 
of the higher.”13 In a similar manner, J. Louis Martyn describes John as having 
a “stereoptic vision,” holding together, in the blending of times that 
characterizes John’s Gospel, the Christ who had been present with his 
followers and who is also now, having ascended to heaven through the cross, 
still present with his community, testifying, with them, to others: “we bear 
witness to what we have seen” (John 3:11).14 This stereoptic vision can also be 
seen between the presentation of Christ in the Synoptics and that in John, 
which follows the movement of thought in the line from the Anaphora of John 
Chrysostom, “in the night in which he was given up or rather gave himself 
up”: in the Synoptics Jesus is put to death and abandoned by his disciples, in 
John he voluntarily goes to the cross and the evangelist stands unashamed at 
its foot. Both are held together in the stereoptic vision of the fourfold gospel. 
A stereoptic vision might also well describe the relationship between the 
Gospel and the Apocalypse, written (if we take John to be the author of both, 
as did most Christians in the second century) by one who stood at the foot of 
the cross and at the throne in heaven, at the same time, for the cross is the 
throne from which he reigns: the Gospel, as a narrative climaxing in the 
apparent defeat of the cross, as it seems to the world, veils the victory of Christ 
under irony, double meaning, and the blending of times, while the 
Apocalypse in turn unveils the eternal and universal dimensions of the 
gospel.  
Doubling is also a prominent feature of Henry’s presentation of the 
Christian revelation. The “duplicity of appearing” that occurs on the world’s 
stage means that “in Christianity everything is doubled”15: appearance and 
truth; body and flesh; the “me” given to myself in the pathos of life and the “I” 
that I project in this world. He continues a little later: “Everything is doubled, 
but if what is double—what is offered to us in a double aspect—is in itself one 
and the same reality, then one of its aspects must be merely an appearance, 
an image, a copy of reality, but not that reality itself—precisely its double.”16 
In exegetical terms, when the Scriptures are read as speaking of Christ, the 
lamb slain at Passover, for instance, is seen to be a “type” of Christ, bearing 
his imprint or stamp, such that the reality in fact precedes the type (for the 
seal precedes the imprint in the wax upon which it is stamped), even though 
the type appears first in the time of the world.17 For Henry, however, the 
image of reality is not simply a mirror image, or a even distorting mirror, but, 
in a harsher (Johannine) manner, a “trap” and a “lie,” unfolding “a universe 
whose principle is hypocrisy.”18 Does Henry, then, have a “stereoptic vision”? 
He clearly sees two different realms of appearance: that of life and that of the 
world. Identity, for Henry, is found in life: it is in the pathos of life, which is 
identical with itself in its self-affectivity, that we find our true identity, and 
indeed an identity, though derivatively, with God. In the world, all we have 
is the duplicitous doubling of this identity, the appearance of a body rather 
than the flesh. Is there, then, no reality to the body, to what appears in the 
world and the world itself? Is Henry’s phenomenological presentation of 
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Christianity some kind of resurgence of Gnosticism, as has been claimed?19  
Alternatively, is the Christ on the cross, appearing in the world and its history, 
a deceptive illusion, resulting in some kind of monism?20 Or, to put the 
question as we raised it earlier: what is the relationship between the pathos 
that is the Passion of Christ, Pascha, and the pathos, or the Arch-Pathos, of 
which Henry speaks?  
It is striking that Henry almost never speaks of the Passion—meaning the 
single event that encompasses the crucifixion, resurrection, and ascension—
nor the cross. In part this is no doubt because he is not reading the Gospels as 
narratives or biographies, dramas unfolding on the stage of the world and its 
history and leading towards their climax on the cross. In this, his work is akin 
to Origen’s On First Principles, which also expounds the “principles” of 
Christian theology, including two full chapters on how the one Christ is 
spoken of as divine and human, without any mention there, or elsewhere in 
the work, of the Passion, apart from an allusive passage, if my reading of this 
is accepted.21 Henry’s phenomenological analyses in his Christian trilogy 
culminate, rather, in the last paragraphs of Words of Christ, with Christ’s 
words in Capernaum and the institution of the Eucharist celebrated across the 
centuries. Moreover, that Henry focuses primarily on Christ as “the Living 
One” (not surprising perhaps given his lifelong fascination with life and its 
own proper phenomenality) indicates that the Christ he presents throughout 
his trilogy is not, as he puts it, the Jesus who wandered from village to village, 
the proper subject for history,22 but rather, although he never quotes from this 
book, the one who speaks in the Apocalypse: “I am the First and the Last, I 
am the Living One, I was dead and behold I am Living” (Apoc. 1:17).  
So far from there being no place for the cross in Henry’s reflection, it is 
rather that, while rarely speaking of it, the one whom he is concerned to 
present as the Arch-Intelligibility of Christianity is always and only the one 
who is known through the Passion, the Paschal Christ.23 Like Paul, Henry is 
focused on Christ and him crucified (cf. 1 Cor. 2:2); and as with Paul he does 
not dwell on the way that the crucified one appeared in the world and to the 
world, but rather focuses on the one proclaimed (thus heard, not seen) as the 
wisdom and the power of God (cf. 1 Cor. 1:24). Indeed, so much is this the 
case that in Barbarism Henry can contrast the truth of arithmetic with the truth 
that is, simply, “the Christ on the cross.”24 Likewise, in words which echo 
Athanasius, he can write, towards the end of Incarnation, of “the Parousia 
concealed on the wood of the cross.”25 Finally, though more allusively, Henry 
speaks of how the coming of the Word in a visible body is “not dissociable” 
from the coming of invisible Life in its Word, “not dissociable from this flesh 
itself.” He then continues: “Its hidden reality now takes place in the Coming 
of the Word in its visible body, the eternal generation of the Only Son, first 
born in absolute Life’s self-generation.”26 This Coming of the Word in its 
visible body would seem to be nothing other than the Parousia of the Word 
upon the cross, visible indeed to the world, but only as dead, while invisibly 
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alive in the flesh generated as the very substance of life. The Passion is, to 
borrow de Boer’s phrase, “the Apocalypse of God,”27 the manifestation of the 
invisible reality that takes place in the heart of God himself, the self-
generation of absolute Life in the eternal generation, through the Arch-Pathos, 
of the Arch-Son, the First Living One and Living Flesh. Upon the cross, the 
body of Christ is exposed to the world for all to see, or rather hear (in the 
proclamation); however “seeing” living and life-giving flesh, not a dead body, 
is only done in the field of life not the world (heard not seen), and so requires 
being called back to the life in which we already live before the world appears: 
“the world will not see me, but you will see me because I live and you also 
will live,” as Henry quotes John.28  
For Henry, then, there is no stereoptic vision looking simultaneously to 
heaven and earth, above and below, as two distinct places, as there is in the 
Targums on Genesis, with the angels ascending and descending to compare 
Jacob on earth with his figure inscribed on the throne in heaven, an image that 
John transposes to the Son of Man as the one who bridges heaven and earth 
so that the angels ascend and descend upon him.29 In the unity of the Paschal 
event as understood by John—whose Gospel does not narrate how Christ was 
put to death, nor present his Passion in terms of an atonement for sin, but 
rather affirms that he offers himself for the life of the world, a self-offering 
which is the paradigmatic expression of love—there is not simply a 
correspondence between heaven and earth, but a coincidence or identity: 
heaven and earth touch upon the cross; as clay is lifted up from the earth into 
heaven, heavenly bread, Christ’s life-giving flesh, is brought down from 
heaven. Heaven, however, is clearly not, as Henry puts it, “interstellar space, 
in the astro-physical universe explored by cosmonauts” but is rather the Life 
that is invisible to the world, the Arch-Pathos of the First Living One, whose 
life pulsates at the heart of all living ones.30 And so rather than saying that 
heaven and earth touch upon the cross, it would be better to say that the 
apocalypse of the cross reveals heaven as the realm of life inhabited by all 
those who live, though invisible to the world. 
To adapt the image used by Origen (Princ. 2.6.6, itself borrowed from the 
Stoics), when a piece of iron, known by its particular properties (cold and 
hard), is placed in a fire, while remaining the iron it is, it is no longer known 
by the properties of iron but only by those of the fire (burning hot and fluid). 
So too, before the Passion Jesus Christ is known by certain observable 
properties and by them identified in various ways deriving from human 
perception (the carpenter from Nazareth, a teacher, and so on). Yet ascending 
through the cross into the heavens and to God, a “consuming fire” (Deut. 9:3; 
Heb. 12:29), he is known as the Word of God and his body, remaining what it 
is by nature, is now only known by the properties of God, beyond space and 
time, while the fire that is God now in turn has a body, though one not 
measured by the space and time of our world. Pascha is both pathos (as with 
Melito) and passage (as with Origen), the hour in which Christ departs from 
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this world to the Father (John 13:1), no longer present in a body seen by the 
world but instead received as the flesh which gives life to the world, though 
in the world this remains veiled as bread. This is indeed a “monism,” for in 
the end God will be “all in all.”31 And so doubling in Henry is not that of a 
correspondence between two different and self-subsisting realms, seen by a 
stereoptic vision that looks to two different places at once, but is rather that 
resulting from an unveiling effected by “the Apocalypse of God,” or, as 
Richard Hays puts it, “the eschatological apokalypsis of the cross.”32 And the 
stereoptic vision that this eschatological unveiling facilitates is to see, in “the 
sufferings of this present time” (and not elsewhere) the groaning of creation 
labouring in travail, awaiting “the apokalypsis of the sons of God,” who are 
foreknown by God and predestined by him “to be conformed to the image of 
his Son so that he might be the first-born of many brethren.”33 
Until the consummation, then, “the sufferings of this present time,” the 
time of the world and the world itself, are real, as is the heaviness of the 
body.34  But “this present time” is only transitory, birth-pangs necessary for 
life to be born, but not remembered when the woman finally gives birth to a 
human being (cf. John 16:21). In the light of the eschatological apocalypsis of 
the cross, these sufferings are seen as preceded by and embraced in the pathos 
of life found in Christ, just as the Passover lamb is preceded by and embraced 
in the Paschal Christ.35 As Henry puts it in the sentence concluding in the 
phrase we have previously cited: “Thus, finally, this flux, this seemingly 
absurd parade of modest pleasures and oppressive thoughts, is secretly 
oriented toward an agony, toward the ultimate transition from the ultimate 
suffering of despair to the eruption of an unlimited joy, as evidenced by the 
Parousia concealed on the wood of the cross.”36 When the veil of the world is 
finally and fully lifted, and the sufferings of the present time give way to 
unlimited joy in the birth into life, we find that our true identity is, and always 
has been, as living enfleshed sons and daughters of God, living ones in the 
Living One. For now, however, although “our citizenship is in the heavens,” 
we still await from it our Saviour (Phil. 3:20); if we have died to the world, 
born into and from life that does not appear in the world, then “our life is 
hidden with Christ in God,” and so when he appears, we too “will appear 
with him,” not in the world or a different spatio-temporal place called heaven, 
but “in glory” (Col. 3:3–4). 
It is in this context, exploring our life in Christ, that Henry comes to some 
of his most provocative statements. Perhaps the most dramatic, and seeming 
to imply a radical monism, is when he says that “Life self-engenders itself as 
me,”37 or, in the saying of Meister Eckhart, of which he is so fond: “God 
engenders me as himself.”38 To be born into life, however, “is not to come into 
the world. To be born is to come into life. … To come into life means to come 
from life, starting from it, in such a way that life is not birth’s point of arrival, 
as it were, but its point of departure.”39 So much is this the case for Henry, 
that he can also say that, as living, human beings are “not created.”40 Henry 
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is not speaking, as we tend to, in a historical or scientific register, but in a 
phenomenological one, in which “the creation of the world ... consists in the 
opening of this horizon of exteriority,” in which something appears as other 
than it is in the self-affectivity of life, life which is nevertheless always prior 
to the appearance of the world.41 As such, creation is essentially secondary or 
subsequent to begetting, though (as with scriptural types of Christ) they 
appear first in the sequence of temporality and causality belonging to the 
world of appearance. As such, Henry claims that what is revealed in Christ 
“obliges us to find … an entirely new and unusual conception of 
temporality—one that is the essence of Life’s own temporality.”42 Such 
‘temporality” would not be a distancing from itself, an ek-stasis, in the 
horizon of exteriority that is the temporality of the world, but, rather, a 
“radically immanent, inek-static, and pathos-filled [pathetique] temporality,” 
in which “there is neither before nor after in the sense we understand them, 
but rather eternal movement, an eternal flux in which life continuously 
experiences itself in the Self that life eternally generates, and which is never 
separated from itself.”43  
Henry’s assertions seem to be very much at odds with traditional 
Christian theology, in which the fundamental distinction would be between 
God and everything else, created ex nihilo, and which would rather start by 
narrating the eternal generation of the second person of the Trinity, before 
turning to creation with its narration of creation and the fall, followed by a 
long history of salvation culminating with Incarnation and the Passion, which 
opens up the possibility for human beings to become, at the end (rather than 
the beginning), sons and daughters of God through baptism. Yet we must 
heed Skinner’s cautions about the “mythology of doctrines,” to consider 
whether the ways in which we are used to hearing various doctrines are in 
fact the best or even appropriate.44 Ignatius of Antioch, for instance, is 
insistent that it is only by sharing in the Passion of Christ that he will be born 
into life as a human being, to “be found to be the pure bread of Christ,” and 
indeed “a word of God.”45 His birth into life to become a human being is 
founded upon the Passion of Christ and sharing in it. And as such, when, with 
Origen, the language of the “eternal begetting” from the Father is used, it is 
so with respect to the Saviour and yet is an eternal begetting extended to the 
believer as well: they too are eternally begotten from the Father.46 Even more 
striking is the affirmation of Maximus the Confessor, as paraphrased by 
Gregory Palamas: “the saints clearly state that this adoption and deifying gift, 
actualized by faith, is real.  … The divine Maximus has not only taught that it 
is real, but also that it is unoriginate (and not only uncreated), 
uncircumscribed and supra-temporal, so that those attaining it are thereby 
perfected as uncreated, unoriginate, and uncircumscribed, although in their 
own nature they derive from nothing.”47 To understand this startling claim, 
it is helpful to return to the image of iron and fire, which we had used above 
in a Christological context: we ourselves, though coming into existence in the 
space and time of this world, have our end in the consuming fire that is God, 
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in which the earthy matter that we are, while remaining what it is, will only 
be known by the properties of the fire, as “uncreated, unoriginate, and 
uncircumscribed” by space or time. To enter into the eternity of God is not to 
enter at some moment of time, to be there thereafter, for there is no before or 
after in his eternity; we have to say that we are already there, and always have 
been, in what Henry describes as the “radically immanent, inek-static, and 
pathos-filled temporality,” in which there is neither before nor after, but an 
“eternal flux in which life continuously experiences itself in the Self that life 
eternally generates,” the Apocalypse of God at the cross, revealing Christ 
himself, as the First Living One, and us as living ones in him. 
It might be the case that it was the “Arian” controversy that resulted in 
the uncreated/created distinction becoming the primary distinction for 
theology. However, even when writing later in the fourth century against 
Eunomius, Gregory of Nyssa would put the matter somewhat differently, and 
more akin to what we have already seen. Following the Apostle Paul’s 
distinction between things that are seen and transient and those that are 
unseen and eternal (2 Cor. 4:18), Gregory asserts: 
Now, the ultimate division of all being is into the 
intellectual and the perceptible [Πάντων τῶν ὄντων ἡ 
ἀνωτάτω διαίρεσις εἴς τε τὸ νοητὸν καὶ τὸ αἰσθητὸν τὴν 
τομὴν ἔχει]; the perceptible nature is called by the Apostle 
“that which is seen.” For as all body has colour, and the 
sight apprehends this, he calls this world by the rough and 
ready name of “that which is seen” … The common term, 
again for the intellectual world, is with the apostle, “that 
which is not seen”: by withdrawing all idea of 
comprehension by the senses he leads the mind [διάνοιαν] 
on to the immaterial and intellectual. Reason [ὁ λόγος] 
again divides this “which is not seen” into the uncreated 
and the created, inferentially comprehending it: the 
uncreated being that which effects the creation, the creation 
that which owes its origin and its force to the uncreated. In 
the sensible world, then, is found everything that we 
comprehend by our organs of bodily sense, and in which 
the differences of qualities involve the idea of more or less 
… But in the intelligible world—that part of it, I mean, 
which is created—the idea of such differences as are 
perceived in the perceptible cannot find a place; another 
method, then, is devised for discovering the degrees of 
greater and less.48 
The distinction between the uncreated and the created finds its place 
within the overarching apostolic distinction between the seen and transient, 
on the one hand, and the unseen and eternal, on the other. The Apocalypse of 
God reveals the fundamental distinction between what is seen and unseen, 
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within which we are led by reason to distinguish between uncreated and 
created.49 And the vision of God this opens up—unseen by the world, but 
running throughout Scripture—is not that of a later philosophical deism, with 
God considered in or by himself (or as three), prior to and independent of 
everything else, but rather a vision of God as presiding over the heavenly 
court, in the celebration of the heavenly liturgy: “God is in the congregation 
of gods” (Ps. 81:1). This vision pervades the Scriptures, and increases in the 
literature of Second Temple Judaism and apocalyptic works, to the New 
Testament proclamation that the crucified and risen Christ has been exalted 
to sit at the right hand of the Majesty on high (Heb. 1:3), in the throne room 
beheld by John in his Apocalypse, in which the One who sits on the throne 
and the slain Lamb are offered “blessing and honour and glory and might 
unto the ages of ages” (Rev. 5:13).50 It was not only in the opening of 
Scriptures that the apostles encountered Christ, but in the breaking of bread, 
and similarly for those who followed them, and so also for Henry, as he 
concludes his trilogy by turning to the words of Christ in Capernaum and 
“the unbroken memorial of this institution [of the Eucharist] across the 
centuries.”51 As Bryan Spinks says of this dimension of Christian worship: 
In Christ the space of heaven and the region of earth are 
united. In the eucharist the worshipper enters heaven 
through Christ, and is represented by the High Priest. Here 
time and eternity intersect and become one, and this world 
and the world to come elide.52  
It is, perhaps, only when the liturgical context of the opening of the Scriptures 
is neglected that the distinction between created and uncreated becomes the 
primary marker for speaking about God and his creation. 
The “doubling” that we have been exploring, resulting from the 
unveiling effected by the Apocalypse of God through the cross, 
simultaneously reveals that what we had thought to be real and our real 
condition is in fact a veil, occluding the truth about ourselves. Yet it is also a 
veil that is not only not dissociable from ourselves, but rather is oriented 
towards the final unveiling of our true condition as sons and daughters of 
God. As the Psalmist says, in the person of God: “I say ‘You are gods, sons of 
the Most High; yet all of you shall die like human beings’“ (Ps 81:6–7). It is by 
sharing in the pathos of Christ that we not only die like human beings, but in 
fact become living human beings, sons of God. Likewise Isaiah: “I have 
begotten sons and exalted them,” then adding, “but they have rejected me” 
(Isa. 1:2). This rejection is not an episode in the history of the world—a “Fall” 
preceded by a time in paradise and followed by a long history of salvation 
culminating in the Incarnation (a Plan A followed by a Plan B, as it were)—
but is again inseparable from the act of unveiling, for there is no unveiling 
unless there is a veil, so that the veil becomes the medium in and through 
which the unveiling occurs. In exegetical terms, when the Scripture is 
unveiled, we don’t see something else, but rather the Christ who has always 
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been there, as treasure hidden in the types and prophecies it contains which 
could not be understood prior to cross, as Irenaeus puts it (haer. 4.26.1). And 
as such the veil of the world is intrinsic to our arrival in life, the life which is 
itself, as Henry noted, always the point of departure.  
As such, as Henry puts it, “the occultation of the condition of the Son 
coincides apparently paradoxically with the very genesis of this condition.”53 
Coming into life is itself the very occasion for an egoism, in which I consider 
myself to be the ground of my own life, directing my attention away from the 
source of life towards that which I can see, do, or perceive in the world that 
opens up before me, resulting in a doubling between, on the one hand, the 
“me” that is given to itself in life and that lives in the heart of Life, hidden in 
Christ, but which, on the other hand, forgetting itself by being absorbed in the 
world, appears as an “I” in the world. Yet the appearances of the world are a 
flux that Henry sees as being oriented towards the final unveiling of unlimited 
joy in the parousia of the Word on the cross. Similarly, Maximus the 
Confessor: “Together with coming-into-being, the first human being gave this 
power—I mean the natural desire of the mind for God—by use of the faculty 
of perception to perceptible things, activating, in the very first movement, an 
unnatural pleasure through the medium of the senses.”54 From the very first 
moment we open our eyes, as living beings, our perception is caught by what 
appears and life disappears from such sight. Yet as Maximus goes on to 
explain, it is by the cycle of pleasure and pain in which we are then immersed, 
the cycle of genesis (coming into being) and corruption (death), that we are 
brought back to ourselves in the life that Christ offers, as, by his Passion, he 
“converted the use of death” so that we too might be able to “use death” as 
the means which “mystically leads to divine and unending life.”55 It is only 
when the solution is unveiled on the cross that the problem is seen for what it 
is, but the problem is thereby turned inside out and becomes, instead, the 
means of sharing in the solution, so resulting in the living human being, “the 
glory of God,” as Irenaeus speaks of such, meaning a martyr following Christ 
in his Passion, and thereby bringing to completion God’s project announced 
in the opening verses of Scripture.56 
In all these ways, then, for Henry it is the Gospel of John and especially 
its Prologue that enables us “to understand the unity and transcendental aim of 
Scripture,” enabling a reading of Genesis as “the first true and rigorous analysis 
of the human condition.”57 Flying in the face of science and philosophy, and 
indeed common sense, and despite all appearances, Christianity asserts that 
human beings are not beings of the world: “they are not of the world, even as 
I am not of the world,” says Christ (John 17:14). As living ones, they are, 
instead, sons and daughters of life and so sons and daughters of God. “You 
are gods, sons of the Most High,” says David (Ps. 81:6), the first words of 
which are quoted by Christ and applied to all those to whom the Word came 
(John 10:34). Thus, unlike every other way of understanding ourselves, 
“Christianity opposes a radically different human being, the Son of God, the 
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Son of Life, the new transcendental human being born within absolute 
phenomenological Life, engendered within this Life’s self-engendering and 
drawing his essence from it alone—the human being resembling Christ, the 
human being in the image of God!”58 It is only because being sons and 
daughters of God, living ones in the Living One, is, from the first, our true 
condition, that we can be recalled to it, just as it is only because he has always 
been a son that the prodigal can return to the father’s house, his proper 
dwelling. 
Finally, regarding the Prologue of the Gospel of John, the Christian 
tradition has consistently understood the becoming flesh, the Incarnation, of 
the Word as the moment of revelation par excellence, for by it “we have seen 
his glory” (1:14). But this is not as straightforward a statement as it is often 
assumed. Henry points out that there are three ways in which this assertion 
can be taken.59 Either, first, it can be taken as saying that “the Word has taken 
flesh in order to reveal itself to human beings,” in which case the revelation is a 
work of the flesh, or, second, the revelation is a work of the Word, leaving 
unanswered why the Word needs flesh for this revelation. The first line of 
interpretation is, indeed, the way in which the verse has been understood by 
many theologians and scriptural scholars: it is “an episode in the biography 
of the Word,” to use a phrase (meant negatively) of Rowan Williams, in which 
the Word, by becoming flesh becomes human, as a being physically visible in 
the world.60 Or, as Henry puts it, “the coming of the Word in human flesh is 
interpreted as the way in which the invisible Word of God shows itself to men 
and women by making itself visible to them in the form of an objective body. 
Becoming-visible in a visible-body would [then] be the principle of the Word’s 
revelation.”61 But, as Henry comments, there are two overwhelming 
difficulties to this line of interpretation. First, that if this were so, then “what 
would show itself to them in this appearance would really still be only a body 
like theirs, about which nothing would allow them to know that it is precisely 
not the body of an ordinary man but of the Word.” It is not enough to see, 
physically, Jesus, living in first-century Judea (or now in our historical 
reconstructions), to see the Word of God.62 This is, as Henry puts it, a 
“banalization of Christ.”63 This is indeed a position sketched out by 
Athanasius in On the Incarnation, as Henry notes, but it is taken only to be 
transcended. As part of his account of the rationale, the logos, of the Passion, 
Athanasius suggests that as our minds were caught by things of sense 
perception the Word had to take a body to catch our attention, as it were. Yet 
it is only by what he does (not how he appears) that we learn “that he is not a 
man only but God and the Word and the Wisdom of the true God,” primarily 
and paradigmatically upon the cross, such that he is thereafter no longer an 
object of physical sight.64  
The second difficulty raised by Henry is that, quite simply, this is not 
what John says: “For John does not say that the Word took on a body, or 
assumed the appearance of one. He says that it ‘was made flesh’.”65 John does 
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not speak of a body, but flesh, and not of appearance, but becoming that flesh. 
Moreover, John does not say that the Word became human, and therefore took 
on flesh along with other attributes (such as a soul, reason, and so on). John 
in fact overturns our understanding of what it is to be human. In our usual 
understanding, “flesh” is that which refers only to our materiality and 
animality, that which we have in common with animals, from which we are 
distinct by having other faculties, such as the ability to think and form ideas, 
the possession of logos lacking in animals, and so which characterizes us as 
human, rational animals. In this case, however, “becoming flesh” would be to 
become less than human! Rather, as Henry puts it, if the Christian tradition 
takes the “becoming flesh” as the way in which the Word became human, 
then, “the human being is defined as flesh.”66 
“Incarnation,” then, does not speak of the addition of a heterogeneous 
element to the Word, enabling the Word to appear in the world, but rather of 
the Word itself becoming flesh, and in so doing redefining what it is to be 
human. Thus, the third alternative offered by Henry for understanding the 
connection between revelation and becoming flesh is that the flesh is not the 
means of a revelation understood as an appearance in the world, but is itself 
the revelation: “It is of itself, in itself, and by itself, that [the Word] was made 
flesh.”67 If the Word reveals God to us through the flesh, then in turn our 
relationship with God must also take place through the flesh. “It is by 
identifying himself with the Word’s flesh (with the body of Christ, corpus 
Christi) that the Christian human being may identify himself with God.”68 The 
“flesh” that the Word, Jesus, becomes through the Passion, is the life-giving 
flesh of Christ offered in the Eucharist, which to be received as life-giving 
requires sharing in his Passion, to be born into life as a living human being, 
the glory of God.69 The Incarnate Word of God is heard, not seen, and received 
as life-giving flesh in those who live in his pathos. 
There are, then, many points of convergence between the 
phenomenological reading of John given by Michel Henry and that of the 
early Christian reading of John, when approached not under the burden of 
Skinner’s “mythology of doctrine,” but rather when read through a 
disciplined historical reading, especially in the light of the paschal tradition 
which they held to have been initiated by John, the high priest of the Paschal 
mystery, standing at the foot of the cross, at the throne in heaven. Finally, both 
Henry and Origen, in their own ways, come to the same insight, that it is 
precisely by standing there, at the very heart of the mystery, that John is able 
to unveil the pathos of life. As Henry puts it, John’s “plan, at first glance 
unrealizable, is to validate Christ’s affirmation of his status as Son by placing 
himself as it were at the interior of this affirmation and in being coextensive 
with its movement. More radically: by placing himself at the interior of the 
very condition of Christ and in identifying with it.”70 It is as the disciple who 
alone stands as the foot of the cross (and at the throne in heaven) that John 
speaks, having become identified with Christ. As Origen put it, to understand 
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the firstfruits of the Gospels which is John, one must also have leant on his 
breast and received Mary to be his mother also, and so “be shown to be Jesus,” 
standing at the foot of the cross and hearing the words “Behold your Son”: 
“for indeed everyone who has been perfect ‘no longer lives but Christ lives in 
him’ and since ‘Christ lives in him’ it is said of him to Mary, ‘Behold your son,’ 
the Christ.”71 For his early followers and readers, John is the High Priest of 
the Paschal mystery, and for Henry he is the one who initiates us into the 
Arch-gnosis, the gnosis of the simple, that is the Arch-intelligibility of Life 
itself. Bringing these different readers of John the Theologian together, then, 
not only enables us to see points of comparison and convergence, but the 
possibility of undertaking a constructive theology, both hermeneutically and 
phenomenologically grounded, centered in the pathos of life and its flesh and 
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